The article tackles the problem of institutional determinants of public expenditures. Within the traditions of public choice and institutional economics, it tests several theories ranging from the fiscal commons framework, Political Business/Budget Cycle (PBC) and path dependence to veto players theory. Its novelty compared to previous research stems from an attempt to test several theories simultaneously, dealing with model uncertainty by utilizing sensitivity analysis within the Bayesian Model Averaging framework with a vast prior structure in terms of model, g and multicollinearity dilution priors. The results confirm a number of hypotheses tested in the area of fiscal management across the recent decades within the group of developed economies, giving especially strong support to the tragedy of the fiscal commons and path dependence concepts, while only partial support to veto players theory. In contrast, explanations based on political budget cycle (PBC) theory are dismissed. Among other interesting findings reported in the study, Scandinavian countries turn out to be the most fiscally responsible when other institutional factors are taken into account. Similarly, contrary to other recent research into the issue of EU fiscal institutional framework, Euro area countries are characterized by limited public expenditures.